T his special issue brief provides an analysis of the transparency of related party business transactions at leading private, nonprofit institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Specifically, it examines disclosures by colleges and universities of their business relationships with firms affiliated with trustees who sit on their boards. These kinds of relationships can divide the loyalty of directors and compromise the board's independent stewardship, particularly over financial decisions. Despite the potential threat that business transactions with trustee-affiliated firms pose to the integrity of college boards, they are widespread among the Massachusetts colleges and universities in this study.
As nonprofit public charities, private colleges and universities are legally required to disclose potential conflicts of interest that arise from such transactions to state and federal authorities and, through those disclosures, to the broader public as well. These transparency requirements are in place to enable authorities and the public to hold universities accountable and to ensure that they are operating in the public interest. However, in a majority of cases reviewed in this study, errors and omissions in reporting raise questions about the quality of information that schools are providing to the public and the effectiveness of the current transparency system.
A review of the two most recently available years' federal and state filings by the 20 wealthiest private Massachusetts colleges and universities generated the following findings:
• Business relationships between schools and their trustees are widespread; 70 percent of the schools in this study reportedly had at least one trustee affiliated with a firm doing business with the school-far greater than the national average of 25 percent.
• 86 percent of the schools reporting potential trustee conflicts in this study provide disclosures of business transactions with related parties that appear to be in some measure erroneous, problematic or substantially incomplete. This problematic reporting raises basic questions about the identity of the interested persons, the nature of the transactions or the amount of money at stake.
• Schools often report information to the IRS that differs markedly from that reported to the state Attorney General.
• Schools fall into three general categories:
- • The greatest number of trustees reported as "interested persons" or "related parties" work in financial services. Indeed, at Boston College and Williams College, five or more trustees were reported as working with firms providing investment services to the college, yet in each case the college provided incomplete information about the size of the investments, the amount of fees paid for those services, or the name of the trustees implicated.
• Harvard University fails to disclose a widely reported business relationship between Harvard Management Company (HMC), the university's endowment manager, and an investment firm affiliated with an HMC board member. Investigations conducted by researchers at Tellus Institute have identified poorly disclosed instances of apparent conflicts of interest among trustees affiliated with investment firms that manage money for the colleges on whose boards they sit. 3 The Institute's 2010 report "Educational Endowments and the Financial Crisis" stimulated fresh scrutiny of potential conflicts at schools such as Dartmouth College, where more than half a dozen trustees have had affiliations with investment firms managing money for the college's endowment. 4 It also encouraged state legislators to file legislation now pending in the Massachusetts State House that would strengthen the reporting requirements for private colleges in areas such as business transactions among interested parties, high pay packages, investment and property holdings, third-party sources of compensation, and the value of nonprofit tax exemptions. 5 This study therefore expands upon the Institute's previous research on the crisis of stewardship among college trustees at prominent New England colleges during the financial crisis and supplements our recent analysis of disclosures of executive compensation at the 20 wealthiest private colleges in Massachusetts. 6 Our focus here is on the state of transparency and disclosure of business transactions between colleges and firms affiliated with their trustees. We review the two most recently available years' state and federal filings by the 20 most well-endowed Massachusetts private colleges and universities and evaluate the quality of their responses to straightforward questions about business transactions with related parties and interested persons.
Our findings are sobering. Whereas 25 percent of private colleges were recently found to have business ties with trustees in a nationwide investigation of more than 600 schools by The Chronicle of Higher Education, we identified at least 70 percent of the 20 wealthiest Massachusetts private colleges as engaging in business transactions with trustees ( Figure 1 ). For 86 percent of the schools reporting business transactions with a trusteeaffiliated firm, their disclosures raised questions because they appeared incomplete, inconsistent, riddled with errors, or simply unclear. Only two schools appeared to provide substantially responsive answers to questions about trustee conflicts on both federal and state filings in ways that did not raise red flags.
In response to Congressional concerns about potential abuses of tax-exemption by nonprofit organizations, the US Internal Revenue Service recently revised the tax return that nonprofits are required to complete (IRS Form 990, the Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax). The changes, introduced in 2008, required greater disclosure of information related to, among other things, compensation and conflicts of interest and business relationships among directors and highly paid officers, employees and contractors. We primarily analyze colleges' responses to Schedules L and O on IRS Form 990, related to transactions with "interested persons." 7 As exempt organizations, nonprofit colleges and universities are required to disclose any "business transactions involving interested persons" by itemizing on the IRS Form 990 the transactions, specifying the name of the trustee or employee involved, his or her position with the school, the amount of money involved, a description of the transaction, and whether the trustee or employee shared in the schools' revenues.
Colleges in Massachusetts must also report "related party transactions" to the Massachusetts Attorney General's Not-for-Profit Organizations/ Public Charities Division. On the Massachusetts Form PC, colleges are required to answer several questions regarding the nature of any related party transactions and to attach a schedule of them detailing "the name and address of the related party, the nature of the transaction, the value or amounts involved in the transaction, and the procedure followed in authorizing the transaction." A summary of our broad analysis of disclosures across state and federal filings is presented in Figure 2 , where we distinguish among three broad states of transparency concerning related party business transactions between colleges and their trustees: broadly responsive (�), no disclosure reported (N.D.), and problematic or in some way questionable (?). Only two schools appeared to provide broadly responsive answers to questions across both state and federal filings for both 2009 and 2010: Brandeis University and Northeastern University. Six schools (30 percent of the total reviewed) reported no trustee-related business transactions: Amherst College, Lesley University, Mount Holyoke College, Olin College of Engineering, Smith College, and Wellesley College.
For the other 60 percent of schools in our study, various problems arose in the course of their state or federal filings. Four schools presented problematic responses across each of the filings we reviewed; we consider them the worst offenders: Boston University, Harvard University, Tufts University, and Williams College. The other eight schools in our sample are uneven reporters that appear responsive in some respects but raise questions in others.
The disclosures by the worst offenders are problematic across the board, but the kinds of errors, omissions, and obfuscation found in them occur frequently among the uneven reporters in our sample. Boston University, one of the worst offenders, pro- Harvard University, including its affiliated investment management company Harvard Management Company ("HMC"), joins Boston University among the worst offenders in transparency for similarly failing to identify by name the board members involved in related party transactions with the university. The university does not disclose potential conflicts related to the management of its $32 billion endowment on the university's primary tax filings, under the official name of "President and Fellows of Harvard University," but rather on an entirely separate filing by HMC, the entity responsible for managing the endowment and other assets. 12 Yet even HMC's IRS Form 990 failed to identify by name interested persons sitting on HMC's board. Instead HMC reported SunGard Data Systems, which provided more than $1.5 million in "technical services" to the university, as the name of the interested person, noting only that "DIRECTOR IS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD." 13 Although the university does not identify the director by name, the reference is to HMC director Glenn Hutchins, co-founder and co-chief executive of the private equity firm Silver Lake, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of SunGard Data Systems. Hutchins sits on SunGard's board in that capacity because SunGard is a portfolio company owned by his firm Silver Lake. Despite this undisclosed private-equity ownership stake, the university makes no effort to explain the nature of this relationship.
14 Even more problematic than this ambiguous language in HMC's Form 990, however, is HMC's failure to disclose the potential conflict of interest resulting from the university's widely reported investments with Greylock Partners, where HMC director William W. Helman serves as a partner. Harvard has reportedly been invested in Greylock venture capital funds since the 1970s, and Helman is a long-standing member of HMC's board. 15 Helman is no stranger to these sorts of conflicts; he is also among the numerous trustees of Dartmouth College affiliated with firms managing multi-million-dollar sums for that college's endowment. 16 Harvard's failure to list such a potential conflict of interest in its federal filings raises questions about what other business transactions involving Harvard officers and trustees and HMC directors have been similarly omitted. Without more robust disclosure requirements related to college investments, the public is unable to assess whether additional appearances of conflicts exist among trustees affiliated with financial services firms. to the college. Although Williams provided a table listing the names, related companies, and services the trustees' firms provided the college (Figure 6 ), the College nevertheless provided no information on the amount of the transactions. For those trusteeaffiliated firms providing investment services, no disclosure is made about the size or the nature of the investments, nor the amount of fees paid to the firms for those services. Even more problematic is the fact that none of these very same related party transactions reported in state filings was disclosed in the College's IRS Form 990. As Figure 7 highlights, not a single trustee or trustee-related firm is reported in the section devoted to business transactions involving interested persons.
Although BU, Harvard, and Williams are among the worst offenders because each of their filings raises questions, other errors, omissions, and opacity are found in one or more of the filings of the eight schools that were uneven reporters in 2009 and 2010. The College of the Holy Cross, for example, provided a general description in its report to the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office of a related party transaction with an unnamed investment partnership with ties to an unnamed trustee. (see Figure 8) . The college reported that investment management fees associated with the partnership amounted to more than $120,000, yet the reported value of the investment is only $23,721, far less than the fees generated by the investment. On its 2009 Form PC, excerpted in Figure 9 below, Berklee refers to insurance purchased by the college from Lynch Associates/TBG Financial, with which two trustees, William Lynch, III, and Allan T. McLean, are associated. Yet the amount of commissions paid to the firm remains undisclosed. The college went on to report that a third trustee, Michael Dreese, the CEO of Newbury Comics, is affiliated with a firm that also purchased insurance from the same trustee-affiliated firm, highlighting the kind of interlocking relationships that could undermine independent stewardship when it comes to basic financial decisions for the college.
Like BU, Boston College did not specify by name the trustees who were interested persons involved in business transactions with the school on its IRS Form 990, as Figure 10 shows. Because the college does identify the trustees with business ties by name in its filing to the Massachusetts Attorney General, we were ultimately able to identify the trustees. BC's case also highlights the predominance of trustees with affiliations to finance. Indeed, no school in our study had more trustees involved in investment-related business transactions for these two reporting years than Boston College. Six of the reported transactions were with financial services firms affiliated with board members. Trustees Robert Morrissey and Mario Gabelli are both affiliated with Gabelli's hedge-fund group GAMCO, which manages money for the BC endowment, while trustees Charles Clough, David O'Connor, and Michaela Murphy Hoag are all affiliated with funds in which the school has also apparently invested. Peter Lynch is the BC trustee affiliated with Fidelity Investments, which manages portions of the college's retirement plans, yet the value of the assets managed is not specified in these disclosures. As with the many problematic disclosures discussed in this report, the limited information included in BC's federal filing raises as many questions as it answers.
B ased on our review of state and federal disclosures of trustee conflicts of interest by the 20 most well-endowed private colleges and universities in Massachusetts, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, leading private Massachusetts colleges do far more business with firms affiliated with their trustees than private colleges do on average nationwide. The Chronicle of Higher Education has identified roughly one in four private colleges as engaged in such related party transactions, whereas we have found that 70 percent of the 20 wealthiest schools in Massachusetts report trustee
Conclusions
For the overwhelming majority of schools that do engage in business with their trustees' firms, the second conclusion to be drawn is that the current transparency system is simply not working. As Archon Fung, Mary Graham, David Weil, and Elena Fagotto of the Harvard Kennedy School have argued, "[e]ffective transparency systems require careful design, attentive enforcement, and periodic maintenance and repair." 18 Given the enhanced reporting requirements in the recently redesigned federal filings, policymakers and the public are clearly demanding fuller disclosure of potential sources of conflicts of interest among trustees of tax-exempt, nonprofit institutions. Although the information requested of schools remains relatively minimal, most schools in our study did not consistently follow the most basic reporting instructions.
Our findings highlight the clear need for "attentive enforcement" of the new IRS filing requirements, and at the state level it seems high time for "periodic maintenance and repair" of what is evidently a broken system. State and federal authorities grant nonprofit colleges the generous benefits of tax exemption because the institutions must serve public purposes. Disclosure mechanisms are meant to provide basic forms of public accountability. When trustees benefit privately-whether directly or indirectly-from their nonprofit board service, the public, which grants those benefits of tax exemption and ultimately bears its costs, has a right to know the full extent of those arrangements. Currently, only a small fraction of schools has provided adequate information for the public even to begin to understand the precise nature and extent of potential trustee conflicts. If colleges and universities want to maintain the public's trust and support, then at a minimum they need to disclose their business ties with trustees much more transparently than the majority of them has done in recent years.
Given the kinds of divided loyalties one routinely observes between private gain and public purpose, it should come as little surprise that the financial crisis proved simultaneously to be a stewardship crisis on far too many campuses.
relationships with firms with which schools conduct business. A disproportionate number of these related party transactions are among trustees working for investment firms managing their schools' money, including hedge funds, private equity firms and others working in the most opaque corners of the capital markets where transparency is viewed more as a threatening source of competitive disadvantage than a public virtue. Given the kinds of divided loyalties one routinely observes between private gain and public purpose, it should come as little surprise that the financial crisis proved simultaneously to be a stewardship crisis on far too many campuses.
